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Morphine vs. ABT-594: A Reexamination 
by the Principle of Double Effect 
by 
Peter A. Clark, S.J., Ph.D. 
Dr. Clark holds the John McShane Chair in Ethics 
at Saint Joseph 's University in Pittsburgh. 
Not long ago, at the request of the nursing staff at a local Catholic hospital , 
I was consulted as a bioethicist regarding the case of an 86-year-old 
woman who had metastatic colon cancer and Alzheimer's disease. The 
non-competent patient was in the last stages of terminal cancer and her 
attending physician, with the consent of her surrogate decision-maker, 
decided that all aggressive medical treatment should be tenninated and 
palliative care should be initiated. The only request by the family was that 
their mother be free of pain. Unsure of the extent of the patient's pain due 
to the Alzheimer's disease the physician started a morphine drip. The 
purpose of the morphine was to manage the patient's pain, but everyone 
knew that the continuous injection of morphine into the patient's vein 
would gradually kill the patient by depressing her respiration. The nursing 
staff was very uncomfortable with this because they questioned whether 
the physician and family were directly trying to shorten the patient's life. 
The patient did not appear to be in serious pain and without the morphine 
she would probably live for days or even weeks. Two ethical questions 
arose: first, was the morphine necessary in this case; and second, was the 
morphine being used for pain management or was it being used as a form 
of assisted suicide? 
It is estimated that 30 to 40 million Americans depend on morphine, 
despite its side effects, to relieve severe pain. The use of morphine as a pain 
reliever, even at high doses, has been accepted by the Roman Catholic 
Church for centuries under the principle of double effect. The Church 
argues that there is a moral difference between the effects of actions which 
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are intended versus those which are foreseen but unintended. "Medicines 
capable of alleviating or suppressing pain may be given to a dying patient, 
even if this therapy may indirectly shorten the person's life so long as the 
intent is not to hasten death." I Even though a foreseen but unintended side 
effect of morphine may be respiratory depression and thus a shortened life 
span, morphine may be prescribed if the intention is to directly alleviate 
pain. The problem is that there are critics who believe that the use of 
morphine for terminal patients is "society's wink to euthanasia."2 As long 
as the "stated" intention is to relieve pain, the use of morphine is legal and 
ethical. Critics contend that some physicians have used and continue to use 
morphine as a form of active euthanasia and justify it ethically under the 
principle of double effect. This has made many inside and outside the 
medical profession suspicious of morphine 's use when administered to 
terminal patients. 
On January 1, 1998 Abbott Laboratories in Chicago announced the 
development of a new painkiller called ABT-594. According to Michael 
Williams, a scientist and vice-president at Abbott, "ABT-594 appears to be 
many times more powerful than morphine, but lacks the serious side-
effects ... Tests with laboratory animals showed that ABT-594 did not 
diminish respiration nor cause constipation. Laboratory animals showed no 
sign of addiction to ABT-594 and the drug appeared to be effective no 
matter how long it was used."3 At this writing, safety trials with humans are 
underway in Europe and similar trials will hopefully be undertaken in the 
United States. The ethical question which arises is: if ABT-594 does prove 
effective and does not have the side effects of morphine, should the 
Catholic Church reexamine its position on morphine as a form of pain 
management considering the objections critics have raised concerning the 
possible misuse of morphine as a form of active euthanasia? 
The purpose of thi s article is threefold: first, to examine the function 
of the principle of double effect; second, to compare and contrast morphine 
and ABT-594 as pain medications; third, to give an ethical analysis of the 
current controversy on the use of morphine and to determine if it is morally 
justifiable under the principle of double effect if ABT-594 is approved as a 
painkiller for humans? 
The Function of the Principle of Double effect 
The principle of double effect is a fundamental principle in Roman 
Catholic moral theology, which is complex in its application to practical 
cases. As the name implies, it refers to one action that produces two 
effects. One effect is intended and is morally good while the other is 
unintended and is morally evil. It is not an inflexible rule or mathematical 
formula, but rather an efficient guide to prudent moral judgment in solving 
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difficult moral dilemmas.4 Historically, many ethicists believe that the 
premises for the principle can be found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. 
However, others contend that the principle may have been understood 
implicitly many centuries before it was actually formulated. Moralist 
Joseph Mangan contends that the principle was used implicitly to justify 
moral actions in the Old Testament.5 Explicitly, Mangan argues that 
Thomas Aquinas is the first to enunciate this principle in his famous 
explanation of the lawfulldlling of another in self-defense in the Summa 
The%gica, II-II, q. 64, a.7c. Ethicists Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress agree with Mangan on this point. 6 Josef Ghoos, however, 
believes that an argument can be made otherwise. "Ghoos showed that the 
moral solutions from the thirteenth through the sixteenth century were of 
isolated concrete cases. In the sixteenth century, Bartolomeo Median (1528 
- 1580) and Gabriel Vazquez (1551 - 1604) began to name the common 
factors among the paradigm cases. Finally, John of St. Thomas (1589 -
1644) articulated the factors into the conditions of the principle as such."7 
However, the four conditions of the principle were not finally formulated 
until the mid-nineteenth century by Jean Pierre Gury.8 The principle of 
double effect specified four conditions which must be fulfilled for an 
action with both a good and a bad effect to be morally justified. 
1. The action, considered by itself and independently of its effects, 
must not be morally evil. The object of the action must be good or 
indifferent. 
2. The evil effect must not be the means of producing the good effect. 
3. The evil effect is sincerely not intended, but merely tolerated. 
4. There must be a proportionate reason for performing the action, in 
spite of its evil consequence.9 
It should be noted that a number of moral theologians known as 
propOJ1ionaiists have argued that the first three conditions of the principle 
of double effect are incidental to the principle, and that in reality it is 
reducible to the fourth condition of proportionate reason. While this is a 
legitimate argument, it is not the purpose of this article to reopen the 
controversy on the validity of the first three conditions. This article will 
remain within the framework of the four conditions of the principle of 
double effect, as it exists in fundamental moral theology, and apply these 
conditions to the use of morphine as an ethical painldller.10 
The use of narcotics to control pain was sanctioned by Pope Pius XII 
under the principle of double effect. In answer to a group of doctors who 
posed the question: "Is the suppression of pain and consciousness by the 
use of narcotics permitted by religion and morality to the doctor and the 
patient (even at the approach of death and if one foresees that the use of 
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narcotics will shorten life)?" The Pope stated: "If no other means exist, and 
if, in the given circumstances, this does not prevent the carrying out of 
other religious and moral duties: Yes."11 According to the principle of 
double effect "in this case, of course, death is in no way intended or sought, 
even if the risk of it is reasonably taken; the intention is simply to relieve 
pain effectively, using for this purpose painkillers available to medicine."12 
The Church believes that suffering is part of the human condition and has a 
special place in God's plan of salvation. However, the Church also believes 
that effective management of pain and suffering is necessary so that the 
person can die comfortably and with dignity and respect. 
The use of morphine to manage pain effectively is ethically justified 
because it meets the four conditions of the principle of double effect. The 
first condition allows for the injection of morphine because the action in 
and of itself is good, in that it effectively alleviates or manages the pain of 
the patient. While morphine may endanger the patient's life by suppressing 
respiration, the injection will not directly terminate the patient's life. The 
second condition allows for the injection of morphine because the good 
effect is not caused by means of the evil effect. The patient's pain is 
alleviated by the morphine, not by the patient's death. The good effect and 
the evil effect happen simultaneously. The third condition allows for the 
injection of morphine because even though there is the possibility that the 
morphine may harm the patient, the intention of the physician is to 
alleviate or manage the patient's pain. Finally, there is a proportionate 
reason for allowing for the morphine because the patient's pain is 
intolerable and there is no hope for a cure.13 Even though morphine is 
morally justified by the principle of double effect, considering the serious 
side effects and the possibility of abuse, would it still be morally justified if 
there were a viable alternative? 
Morphine vs. ABT-594 
Morphine is an opium alkaloid and is the prototype of the opioid 
analgesics. In the non-tolerant patient with severe pain, it provides 
analgesia at a dose of about 10 mg 1M that does not result in severe 
alterations in consciousness. Morphine affects both the initial perception of 
pain and the emotional response to it. Total relief from pain is not always 
possible to achieve, but morphine can reduce the level of distress and 
suffering. Traditionally, oral morphine has been considered to be 
ineffective. It is transformed rapidly in the liver and excreted in the urine. 
However, with upward titration of the dose, oral morphine can be very 
effective in managing chronic pain. A slow-release tablet that dispenses 
morphine over 8 to 12 hours and a concentrated oral solution have been 
developed in attempts to make oral morphine more acceptable. Morphine 
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sulfate is the most commonly used water-soluble salt. Very low doses of 
intraspinal morphine (e.g., 5 to 10 mg epidurally or 0.5 to 1 mg 
intrathecally) can provide long-lasting (up to 24 hour) pain relief 
postoperatively and in selected nontolerant cancer patients. To date, 
morphine is the drug most commonly used to manage pain for cancer 
patients. 14 
Adverse effects of morphine are dose-related. These adverse effects 
include respiratory depression, decreased cough reflex, nausea, vomiting, 
constipation, itch, sedation, and confusion. Morphine can also produce 
miosis and can cause contraction of peripheral smooth muscle, the most 
important effect of which is decreased propulsive movements in the 
gastrointestinal tract, causing constipation. Morphine causes the venules 
(capacitance vessels) to dilate, and hypotension may occur in hypovolemic 
patients or those who suddenly assume the upright position. The 
development of tolerance to morphine varies from one physiologic system 
to another (e.g., tolerance develops slowly to the constipating effect, 
whereas respiratory depression or nausea typically wanes soon after 
treatment begins). During chronic therapy, an increase in dosage may 
become necessary to achieve the same degree of pain relief, since the 
duration of action shortens and the peak analgesic effect decreases. IS 
One major criticism of using morphine as a painkiller is that 
physicians often do not adequately explain to patients or their appropriate 
surrogate decision-makers how morphine works and what are its side 
effects. This is because many physicians are not adequately trained in the 
art of pain management. Instead of referring the terminal patient to a 
palliative care team which has expertise in pain management, the physician 
writes an order for morphine and the family is left to watch their loved one 
die. Questions about the amount of morphine prescribed, who should 
determine if the dosage should be increased, and what side effects may be 
expected, are left unanswered. Families are often unprepared for what they 
will experience. Instead of becoming sedated, many patients experience 
the reaction agitation. Families find themselves struggling just to keep the 
patient in bed. Often, physicians will write an order to increase the 
morphine dosage at the direction of the surrogate, without considering the 
fact that the surrogate may not be competent to make such decisions. 
Christine Campi, executive director of Medical Mission International, 
explains the sense of frustration and lack of guidelines many family 
members feel when confronted with the use of morphine for their loved 
one. In an editorial that appeared in The New York Times , Campi explains 
how her husband 's oncologist had written an order that her husband, who 
was dying of terminal bone cancer with metastasis to the brain, could be 
given up to 30 milligrams of morphine at her direction. She was the 
surrogate decision maker. "At doses of 4 to 6 milligrams, my husband 
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tossed and turned and his breathing was ragged. I asked for 10 milligrams 
and he began to choke. I asked the nurse to push the morphine pump to 30 
milligrams and my husband died, no longer struggling, within two hours. 
Did I kill him? I don ' t know. Did I push the morphine pump to warp speed 
to relieve his suffering or mine?: I don ' t knoW."16 In many instances 
patients and families are ill-prepared emotionally and clinically to make 
these decisions concerning the use of morphine. The result is that either the 
patient's pain is not managed adequately, or the families are left with 
feelings of guilt that they may have caused the death of the patient. Family 
members may carry these feelings of guilt and frustration with them for a 
lifetime. Ethically, similar situations have led many health care 
professionals and non-health care professionals to question the use of 
morphine as an effective way to manage pain in terminal patients. 
News that Abbott Laboratories had developed a new pain medication 
that has the benefits of morphine, but none of its side effects, was hailed as 
a possible major breakthrough in pain management. Apparently ABT-594 
acts not through opioid receptors but through a receptor for the 
neurotransmitter acetylcholine and blocks both acute and chronic pain in 
rats. ABT-594 was developed from a compound called epibatidine, which 
was extracted from the skin of an Ecuadorian from called Epipedobates 
tricolor, at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). In 1976, John Daly, of 
the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, an 
NIH agency, found epibatidine to be 200 times more potent than morphine 
at blocking pain in animals. Daly's research came to an abrupt halt, 
however, when the lab-grown frogs failed to produce the compound and he 
could no longer collect the Epipedobates tricolor because they were placed 
on the endangered species list. The sample was stored in a freezer for 
future research. A decade later, Thomas Spande and Martin Garraffo at the 
NIH, using a nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, determined the 
chemical structure of epidatidine and found that it resembled nicotine. 
They learned that it activates the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor. The 
problem was that while epibatidine is a potent analgesic, it is far too toxic 
for human use. It was found to cause seizures and even death in lab 
animals. The results of their findings and a diagram of the chemical 
structure of epibatidine was published in the journal Science. Researchers 
at Abbot Laboratories realized that epibatidine resembled a group of drugs 
aimed at the nicotinic receptor that the company was studying in its search 
for a treatment for Alzheimer's disease. Out of 500 variants they produced 
and then screened in animals, researchers decided to focus on ABT-594 
because it seemed to work against different types of pain and produced few 
side effects. It also lacked the elements that made the frog compound 
toxic. 17 
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In tests conducted by the Abbott team, "ABT-594, nicotine, and 
morphine were compared in animal models of acute thermal (rat hot box) 
and persistent chemical (formalin test) pain. In the hot box assay, morphine 
and nicotine are effective in attenuating the response to pain. ABT-594 
was, however, 30 to 70 times more potent in eliciting a dose-dependent 
antinociceptive effect, with an efficacy similar to that seen with 
morphine."' 8 Researchers also found that in addition to not causing 
constipation, ABT-594 depresses the respiratory system far less than 
morphine and makes animals more alert instead of sedating them. In at 
least one test, animals showed no sign of addiction and ABT-594 appeared 
to be effective no matter how long it was used. Rats that were taken off 
ABT-594 after being treated with a high dose for ten days did not suffer the 
withdrawal symptom of appetite suppression seen after treating with other 
opioids." '9 These results appear to be very promising, but until human 
testing is completed both in Europe and in the United States those suffering 
from severe pain will have to continue to rely on morphine.20 
Ethical Analysis 
In the event that ABT-594 does prove to be an effective painkiller in 
humans with minimal side effects, a reexamination of the ethical 
justification for the use of morphine as a pain reliever for terminal patients, 
by the principle of double effect, will be necessary. I would argue that 
morphine would not be ethically justifiable because the fourth condition of 
the principle of double effect would be violated. The fourth condition 
states that there must be proportionate reason for performing an action, in 
spite of its evil consequence. Since morphine can bring on respiratory 
depression and an earlier death, and ABT-594 does not depress respiration, 
there is not a proportionate reason for allowing the use of morphine as a 
pain reliever for terminal patients. 
Proportionate reason refers to both a specific value and its relations 
to all the elements (including premoral evils) in the action.21 The Catholic 
Church allows for the use of morphine today because the value of relieving 
pain outweighs the premoral evil of the possibility of death from 
respiratory depression. The question that arises, should ABT-594 prove to 
be effective, is whether a proportionate reason exists for the use of 
morphine? To determine this one must examine the criteria for 
proportionate reason. Ethicist Richard McCormick, SJ., proposes three 
criteria for determining if a proper relation exists between a specific value 
and the other elements of an act: 
1) The means used will not cause more harm than necessary 
to achieve the value. 
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2) No less harmful way exists at present to protect the 
value. 
3) The means used to achieve the value will not undermine 
it.22 
According to McCormick's criteria, if ABT-594 becomes a viable 
painkiller for terminal patients, the use of morphine would be unethical by 
all three criteria. First, since morphine does depress respiration and can 
cause an early death, morphine would cause more harm than necessary. 
Second, if ABT-594 proves to be effective, then a less harmful way exists 
to relieve pain for the terminal patient and it will not hasten death. Third, 
using morphine will undermine the value of human life because it can 
depress respiration and hasten death. If proven effective, ABT-594 will 
relieve the patient's pain with no life-threatening side effects. Therefore, in 
the event that ABT-594 proves effective, the use of morphine as a pain 
reliever for terminal patients should no longer be morally justified by the 
principle of double effect. 
Conclusion 
In our present culture, the debate concerning death and dying is 
becoming fixated on the patient's right to die with dignity and respect. 
Patients believe they have the right to determine when and how they should 
die, and it is the physician's role to assist them. Death with dignity has 
become synonymous with physician-assisted suicide. As a result, health 
care professionals are becoming suspicious of one another when certain 
patients die sooner rather than later. Part of this suspicion lately has 
focused on the use of morphine as the cause of death. Death by sedation 
can no longer be ignored. I believe that morphine has been used both as a 
form of active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide for years under 
the ethical guise of the principle of double effect. The morphine drip is 
used at the discretion of physicians and its use is often arbitrary and 
inequitable. Oftentimes the decision to use morphine is not made for the 
good of the patient but for the convenience of the family, the physician and 
the hospital. In addition, since surrogate decision-makers are often not 
emotionally and clinically competent to decide whether morphine should 
be administered and how much should be administered, when death 
comes, so too, come the agonizing questions. Did I help to kill my father? 
Was my intention to ease my mother's pain or to ease my own suffering? 
Presently, morphine is the most effective drug we have to ease 
intolerable pain for most terminal cancer patients. If the physician's 
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intention in using morphine is to manage a patient's pain and the physician 
is aware of the foreseen but unintended consequence of respiratory 
depression and a possible early death, then morphine can continue to be 
justified by the principle of double effect. However, if ABT-594 does prove 
to be an effective painkiller for terminal patients and it does not have the 
side effects of morphine, then morphine can no longer be justified under 
the principle of double effect because it violates proportionate reason. 
Until the clinical trials with humans prove successful, health care 
professionals should continue to monitor the use of morphine with 
terminal patients. The nurses who initiated the ethics consultation on the 8-
year-old woman with metastatic colon cancer had legitimate questions 
concerning the physician's use of morphine. As a result, I called a meeting 
of the physician, the family, and the nursing staff, so that each had an 
opportunity to voice his or her concerns. At the end of the hour-long 
meeting all parties were in agreement that the use of morphine was 
justifiable and the best course of pain management for this patient. It was a 
good learning experience for all parties concerned and it emphasized the 
importance of communication and team work. As medicine becomes more 
sophisticated and technological, there is a need for physicians, nurses and 
patients to be in dialogue with one another. Questions need to be asked, 
alternatives should be suggested, and the hermeneutic of suspicion ought to 
be employed in order to ensure that all patients are treated with dignity and 
respect. Only then will suspicion be replaced with trust. 
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